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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE
SENIORITY SYSTEM EXCEPTION:
AMERICAN TOBACCO Co. v PATTERSON
HE American Tobacco Company operated two plants that
manufactured tobacco products in Richmond, Virginia. The To-
bacco Workers' International Union' and its affiliate Locals 182
and 2162 were the collective bargaining agents for hourly paid production
workers at the company's plants. Each plant was divided into two depart-
ments, 3 and prior to 1963 the workers in these departments were racially
segregated due to discriminatory policies followed by the company and the
union.4 Under government pressure,5 the company and the union cor-
rected some of their discriminatory practices in 1963,6 but the departments
1. This litigation began in 1969. In 1978 the Tobacco Workers' International Union
merged with the Bakery and Confectionary Workers' International Union to form the pres-
ent Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco Workers' International Union. This merger ex-
plains the different names by which the union is referred to in the various court opinions.
Brief for Petitioner Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco Workers' International Union at I
n. I.
2. White employees were represented by Local 182; black employees were represented
by Local 216. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 263 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976).
3. Each plant was divided into prefabrication and fabrication departments. The pre-
fabrication departments blended and prepared the tobacco, and the fabrication departments
manufactured the final product. Jobs in the fabrication department of each plant were gen-
erally more desirable because of the nature of the work and the higher pay. 535 F.2d at 263.
Before 1963 the company usually placed blacks in the prefabrication departments and re-
served the higher paying fabrication department jobs for whites. Blacks were discouraged
from transferring into the fabrication departments because each department had a separate
seniority roster, and in order to transfer to a new department, an employee had to forfeit his
seniority. Id
4. For a detailed discussion of the history of discrimination against blacks in the to-
bacco industry, see H. NORTHRUP, THE NEGRO IN THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY (1970); G.
STARNES & J. HAMM, SOME PHASES OF LABOR RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA 36-70 (1934).
5. The Defense Supply Agency, a government procurement agency, threatened to can-
cel all government contracts with the company if it continued to follow certain racially dis-
criminatory practices. Brief for Respondents John Patterson, et al. at I I n. 12. An executive
order relating to the formation of government contracts with companies following discrimi-
natory employment practices prompted the agency threats. 535 F.2d at 263.
6. The separate black and white locals were merged into Local 182, and the company
abolished its policy of keeping separate seniority rosters for each department, switching to a
plant-wide seniority system. 535 F.2d at 263.
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of each plant remained largely segregated. 7 In 1968 the company sug-
gested nine lines of progression as a method for determining advancement
of employees from lower paying to higher paying jobs.8 The union ac-
cepted these lines of progression in 1969. Shortly thereafter, John Patter-
son and two other black employees filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission 9 alleging that the lines of progres-
sion were racially discriminatory' 0 in violation of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.11 Following unsuccessful conciliation efforts, Patterson
and other black employees filed a class action against the company and the
union in federal district court. 12 The district court found that all nine lines
of progression perpetuated past racial discrimination, but concluded that
discrimination was justified by business necessity in three of the lines. 13
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court in part, it modified in part and remanded the case
for further proceedings on the issue of remedies.14 While the case was on
remand, the United States Supreme Court rendered two decisions 15 inter-
preting the protection extended to seniority systems by section 703(h) of
7. Despite the change from departmental to plant-wide seniority, from 1963 to 1968
only ten black employees were added to the predominantly white fabrication departments.
Brief for Respondents John Patterson, et al at 13-15. The company's use of unwritten,
subjective selection procedures perpetuated the segregation of departments. 535 F.2d at 263.
8. The lines of progression basically consisted of two jobs: an employee had to work
in the bottom job of a line before he was eligible for promotion to the top job.
9. Under title VII's enforcement provisions, an aggrieved party may file a charge with
the EEOC within a specified time after the occurrence of an unfair employment practice.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). The EEOC is then directed by
the statute to conduct an investigation, and if it finds reasonable cause to believe the charge
is true, it is authorized to attempt to obtain conciliation. When conciliation efforts are un-
successful, the Commission may bring a civil action against the respondent. If the EEOC
does not sue, the charging party may request a right-to-sue letter, which, if granted, allows
him to bring suit against the respondent. Id § 2000e-5(f)(l). See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER
& R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 266-361
(1980) [hereinafter cited as C. SULLIVAN]. See generally Walker, Title VIP= Complaint and
Enforcement Procedures and Relief andRemedies, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 495 (1966).
10. Seven of the nine lines of progression linked nearly all-white top jobs from the
fabrication departments with nearly all-white bottom jobs from those departments. The
other two lines linked nearly all-black top jobs from the prefabrication departments with
nearly all-black bottom jobs in prefabrication. Brief for Respondents John Patterson, et al
at 20 nn. 21-22.
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (c) (1976). Title VII
of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer or labor union to "discriminate against any
individual. . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id
12. The class action brought by Patterson also alleged violation of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The class action was consolidated for trial with a subse-
quent action filed by the EEOC alleging both race and sex discrimination.
13. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 778, 782-83
(E.D. Va. 1974). The business necessity test, as formulated by the Fourth Circuit, deter-
mines whether an employment practice is "necessary to the safe and efficient operation of
the business" such that it overrides any racially discriminatory impact. Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
14. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976).
15. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes
77-90 and accompanying text.
NOTES
title VII.' 6 On the basis of these decisions, the company and the union
moved to vacate the district court's orders and to dismiss the complaints. 17
The district court denied the motion,' 8 stating that the lines of progression
were not bona fide and therefore not protected by section 703(h). 19 A di-
vided panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the motions were properly de-
nied20 and concluded that the six lines of progression at issue were not
protected by section 703(h) because they were not part of a seniority sys-
tem.2' The Fourth Circuit reheard the case en banc and held that section
703(h) protected only those seniority systems in existence at the time of
title VII's effective date. 22 The United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari. Held, reversed: Section 703(h) applies to all bona fide seniority sys-
tems, regardless of whether they were established before or after the
effective date of title VII. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S. Ct.
1534, 71 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1982).
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIORITY SYSTEM EXCEPTION
A. Legislative History of Section 703(h)
The early 1960s found the United States embroiled in an era of racial
unrest. Studies during that period indicated that racially discriminatory
16. Section 703(h) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or natural origin ....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
17. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744, 746 n.l (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
The motions were apparently made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which
authorizes relief from a final judgment when the judgment is based upon a prior judgment
that "has been reversed or otherwise vacated." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
18. 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 371, 377 (E.D. Va. 1977).
19. The test for determining whether or not a seniority system is bona fide has been
described as involving four factors:
(1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all employees
equally from transferring between seniority units;
(2) whether the seniority units are in the same or separate bargaining units
(if the latter, whether that structure is rational and in conformance with
industry practice);
(3) whether the seniority system has its genesis in racial discrimination; and
(4) whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained free from
any illegal purpose.
Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 542 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 352 (5th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S.
1034 (1978)); see S. AGID, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 537 (2d ed. 1979); C. SULLIVAN,
supra note 9, at 136.
20. 586 F.2d 300, 305 (4th Cir. 1978).
21. Id at 303. A seniority system has been defined as "a scheme that, alone or in tan-
dem with non-'seniority' criteria, allots to employees ever improving employment rights and
benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent employment increase." California Brewers
Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1980); see infra note 53.
22. 634 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc). The effective date of title VII was July 2,
1965, one year after its enactment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 716, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
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employment practices were contributing to a depressed economic situation
among black Americans.2 3 On June 19, 1963, President Kennedy, in a
special message to Congress, expressed concern over "a rising tide of dis-
content that threatens the public safety" and called for legislative action.
24
The following day, H.R. 7152, the ancestor of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
was introduced in the House of Representatives. 25 During consideration
of the bill, Representative Dowdy proposed an amendment similar to sec-
tion 703(h),26 but the amendment was defeated without discussion or de-
bate.27 The initial bill, as passed by the House nearly eight months after
its introduction, did not contain an equivalent to section 703(h) or any
other reference to seniority.28
The issue of seniority rights received little attention until the bill reached
the floor of the Senate.29 During a floor debate that lasted more than
eighty days,30 some Senators criticized the bill by claiming it would de-
stroy existing seniority systems.3' In response to this criticism, Senators
Clark and Case32 placed three documents into the Congressional Record
expressing the view that title VII would not affect existing seniority sys-
tems. These documents were a statement prepared by the Department of
23. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT REPORT (1961), summarized in 48
LAB. REL. REFERENCE MANUAL 103 (1961).
24. 109 CONG. REC. 11,174 (1963). This message was the second special message on
civil rights submitted by President Kennedy to Congress within a five-month period. See
Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 432 (1966).
25. 109 CONG. REC. 11,252 (1963). H.R. 7152, as introduced in the House, appears in
Civil Rights." Hearings on HR. 7152 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 649-60 (1963).
26. 110 CONG. REC. 2727-28 (1964). Representative Dowdy offered the amendment for
the purpose of making "the seniority or merit system of hiring an exception to the rule of
race, color, creed, and so on, in order that an employer may make a hiring decision or
determination based on the merit system or seniority system .... " Id at 2725.
27. Id at 2728.
28. Id at 2804; see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws.- A General Approach to Objective Criteriafor Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1598, 1608 (1969). Although the bill passed the House without an exception for seniority
systems, it was not passed without criticism. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 71
(1963) (minority report of the House Judiciary Committee: "Seniority is the base upon
which unionism is founded. Without its system of seniority, a union would lose one of its
greatest values to its members. The provisions of this Act grant the power to destroy union
seniority." (emphasis in original)).
29. The supporters of the bill were able to bring the bill directly to the Senate floor
before referring it to any standing committee. Senator Morse moved to refer the bill to the
Judiciary Committee. The Morse motion, however, was tabled and the Senate proceeded to
debate the bill before the whole body. 110 CONG. REC. 6417-55 (1964); see Vaas, supra note
24, at 444.
30. For a full discussion of the protracted legislative history of title VII, see Vaas, supra
note 24.
31. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 486 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hill: Title VII "would
undermine a basic fabric of unionism, the seniority system."); id at 7091 (statement of Sen.
Stennis: Title VII would require "[pireferential advance of minorities so as to destroy sen-
iority in employment.").
32. Proponents of the bill had organized "bipartisan captains" for each important title
of the bill. Senators Clark and Case were the bipartisan captains in charge of explaining,
defending, and leading discussion on title VII. Id at 6528 (statement of Sen. Humphrey);
see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 351 n.35 (1977); Vaas,
supra note 24, at 444-45.
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Justice, 33 an interpretive memorandum prepared by Senators Clark and
Case,34 and written responses by Senator Clark to questions asked earlier
by Senator Dirksen.35 Although these documents were not read on the
floor of the Senate36 and were introduced prior to the drafting of section
703(h), they have been held to be "authoritative indicators" of the purpose
of that section.37
While debate on the bill continued on the Senate floor, a bipartisan
group led by Senators Mansfield and Dirksen was engaged in informal
conferences trying to reach agreement on amendments to the bill.38 These
efforts produced a substitute for the entire bill, the Mansfield-Dirksen
amendment. 39 This substitute bill included section 703(h), which was ad-
ded to insure that differences in employment conditions pursuant to a bona
fide seniority system would not be considered an unfair employment prac-
tice absent an intent to discriminate. 4° The Senate passed the Mansfield-
Dirksen substitute as amended,41 and following concurrence by the House
and signing by the President, it became the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42
In the Senate, the entire consideration of the bill took place on the floor
and consequently no committee report exists to which courts can turn in
33. 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964). The text of the statement pertaining to seniority
reads:
First, it has been asserted that title VII would undermine vested rights of sen-
iority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights
existing at the time it takes effect. . . . [lIn the ordinary case, assuming that
seniority rights were built up over a period of time during which Negroes were
not hired, these rights would not be set aside by the taking effect of title
VII. . . . Any differences in treatment based on established seniority rights
would not be based on race and would not be forbidden by the title.
Id.
34. Id at 7212. The memorandum stated: "Title VII would have no effect on estab-
lished seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective." Id at 7213.
35. Id at 7216-17. Two of the questions and responses pertain to seniority:
Question. . . . Normally, labor contracts call for "last hired, first fired." If
the last hired are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if his contract re-
quires they be first fired and the remaining employees are white?
Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last
hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired" he can still
be "first fired" as long as it is done because of his status as "last hired" and not
because of his race.
Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his employment list because
of discrimination what happens to seniority?
Answer. The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to
change existing seniority fists.
Id at 7217.
36. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 28, at 1610.
37. 'Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 352.
38. Vaas, supra note 24, at 445.
39. 110 CONG. REC. 11,935-36 (1964).
40. Two Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bills were actually proposed. Id at 11,931 (first
amendment), 13,310-19 (second amendment). Section 703(h) was the same in both substi-
tutes. Vaas, supra note 24, at 447.
41. 110 CONG. REC. 14,511 (1964). The Senate accepted five amendments to the Mans-
field-Dirksen substitute bill. Vaas, supra note 24, at 446.
42. Vaas, supra note 24, at 457.
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interpreting the Act.43 Thus, the legislative history of section 703(h) is
largely contained in the Congressional Record." Courts are not accus-
tomed to relying on this type of legislative history, and this fact may serve
as a partial explanation for the differing constructions courts have given
section 703(h).45
. Judicial Interpretations of Section 703(h)
As finally enacted, title VII makes it unlawful for employers or labor
organizations to discriminate against employees on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or natural origin."'46 The United States Supreme Court
first interpreted the scope of title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 47 Griggs
involved a class action brought by black employees who alleged that the
company's practice of using professionally developed aptitude tests to
make hiring and transfer decisions was racially discriminatory in violation
of title VII.48 The employer contended that although the tests had a dis-
criminatory impact on blacks, they were not illegal under title VII since
they were not used with an intent to discriminate. 49 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and held that title VII proscribes practices that may
be fair in form, but operate with a discriminatory impact. 50 Thus, the
Griggs decision defined discrimination in terms of effect rather than in-
tent.51 Title VII provides an exception to this general rule, however, in
section 703(h).52 That section provides that bona fide seniority systems
discriminatory in operation are not unlawful as long as they are not the
result of any intent to discriminate.
53
43. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 28, at 1609.
44. See Vaas, supra note 24, at 457-58.
45. Id
46. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (c) (1976).
47. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
48. Id at 426-28. The company had engaged in open discrimination on the basis of
race prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of title VII. On that date the company instituted
the test requirement, which operated to disqualify black applicants at a higher rate than
white applicants. Id; see Note, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The First Landmark Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 25 Sw. L.J. 484, 485 (1971).
49. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1233 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424
(1971). The company also contended that the tests were not a violation of title VII, because
they were professionally developed and instituted on the theory that they would improve the
quality of the work force. See Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implicationsfor
Private and Public Employers, 50 TEx. L. REV. 901, 907 (1972).
50. 401 U.S. at 431.
51. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise.- Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1972).
52. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976); for the text of
§ 703(h), see supra note 16.
53. "Seniority system" as used here and throughout this Note refers to competitive sta-
tus seniority. Competitive status seniority is a method of determining which employees get
certain benefits, such as promotions, job security, or shift preference, based on the amount of
time they have worked. The longer an employee works the better his opportunities for ad-
vancement. See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority
Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1962); Cooper & Sobol, supra note 28, at 1601-02;
Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race." The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 1-3 (1967).
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The unusual legislative history of section 703(h) has contributed to this
section's being one of the most complex problems in title VII litigation.5 4
A most troublesome aspect of the protection given seniority systems by
section 703(h) is that, although these systems are important and serve
many useful purposes,55 they also have the undesirable effect of preserving
the effects of earlier discrimination.5 6 A district court wrestled with this
problem in one of the earliest title VII cases, Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc. 57 Prior to the enactment of title VII, Philip Morris had engaged in
overt racial discrimination by maintaining segregated departments at its
Richmond plant, with the lower paying jobs concentrated in the all-black
departments.5 After the effective date of title VII, blacks were allowed to
transfer into the formerly all-white departments, but by doing so they
would forfeit their seniority and start at the bottom of the seniority roster
in the new department.5 9 Thus, the seniority system operated to lock
blacks, who were hired before title VII became effective, into the segre-
gated departments. After reviewing the statements relating to seniority
introduced by Senator Clark,60 the court found that section 703(h) did not
protect this seniority system because "Congress did not intend to freeze an
entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that ex-
isted before the act."'61 To support this conclusion, the court held that a
seniority system is not bona fide if it has a discriminatory effect.62
Quarles was the first in a series of cases that followed the "present effects
of past discrimination" test.63 Under this test, seniority systems that per-
54. C. SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 126.
55. Seniority systems serve several legitimate functions. For the employer, seniority
systems are attractive because they promote efficiency; they encourage new employees to
stay with the company by enticing them with the prospect of advancement, and they reduce
the amount of retraining necessary. For the employee, seniority systems provide protection
from the whims or personal preferences of management and give all employees a basis for
predicting their future employment positions. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505, 513 (E.D. Va. 1968); Cooper & Sobol, supra note 28, at 1604-05.
As a result of their usefulness, "[sjeniority systems ... are of vast and increasing impor-
tance in the economic employment system of this Nation." Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976) (citing S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 104-15 (1960)); see Gould, supra note 53, at 1.
56. For example, a black is hired by American Tobacco before 1965, when overt dis-
crimination is still practiced. As a result he is assigned a low paying position in the prefabri-
cation department. After 1965, discriminatory employment practices are unlawful, but the
black worker will be discouraged from transferring from the low paying prefabrication de-
partment to the higher paying fabrication department because, under a departmental senior-
ity system, transferring would mean losing all of his old department seniority and starting on
the bottom rung in the fabrication department. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 344 n.27 (1977).
57. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
58. Id at 508.
59. Id at 513.
60. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
61. 279 F. Supp. at 516.
62. Id at 517.
63. See United States v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 471 F.2d 582, 587-88 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658-
59 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 36, 416
F.2d 123, 133 n.20 (8th Cir. 1969).
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petuated the effects of past discrimination were not considered bona fide
and thus were not protected by section 703(h). 64 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit adopted this interpretation of the seniority system excep-
tion in Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States,65 a case involving
facts similar to Quarles. The Fifth Circuit declared that the departmental
seniority system in question was unlawful because it perpetuated the ef-
fects of pre-Act discrimination without any business necessity justifica-
tion,66 and thus was not a bona fide seniority system. 67 In addition, the
Fifth Circuit found that a seniority system that perpetuated intentional dis-
crimination was not protected by section 703(h)68 because it was the "result
of an intention to discriminate.'"69
The United States Supreme Court first attempted to clarify the meaning
of section 703(h) in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 70 Franks
presented the issue of whether a post-Act discriminatee could be awarded
retroactive seniority to place him in the position he would have otherwise
occupied but for the discriminatory practices. 7' The argument against
granting such relief was that it would dilute the seniority rights of incum-
bent employees and thereby violate section 703(h).72 Following a detailed
analysis of the legislative history of section 703(h),73 the Supreme Court
rejected this argument and held that section 703(h) merely defined which
seniority systems are discriminatory.74 The Court concluded that section
703(h) imposed no limit on the equitable relief authorized by title VII's
remedial provisions. 75 By holding that awards of retroactive seniority did
not undermine the protection given seniority systems by section 703(h), the
Court in Franks construed that section as a narrow exception to the gen-
eral rule of title VII.76
64. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346 n.28 (1977).
65. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
66. See supra note 13; infra note 131.
67. 416 F.2d at 988.
68. Id at 995-96.
69. Id at 995 (emphasis in original) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(1976)); see supra note 16.
70. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
71. Id at 750.
72. Id at 757; see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417 (5th Cir. 1974),
modified, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
73. 424 U.S. at 759-62; see supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
74. 424 U.S. at 761. The Court stated, "[lit is apparent that the thrust of the section is
directed toward defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice .
Id.
75. Id at 761-62; see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
508-09 (1976).
76. By allowing the equitable remedy of retroactive seniority awards, the Court implic-
itly decided that the policy of eliminating discrimination outweighed the policy of protecting
seniority rights. Awarding retroactive seniority to a discriminatee diminishes the established
seniority rights of other employees. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 75, at 508;
Note, Civil Rights-Section 703(h)-Post-Act Perpetuation ofPre-Act Discrimination Through
An Established Seniority System is Not Illegal, 52 TUL. L. REv. 397, 404 (1978). Thus, by
subordinating the seniority rights of incumbent employees to the rights of other employees
to be free from discrimination, the Court in Franks supported the view that § 703(h) should
be construed as a narrow exception to title VII.
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In 1977 the Supreme Court reexamined section 703(h) in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States77 and gave the section a broader
construction. Teamsters involved a departmental seniority system, like
those in Quarles and Local 189, that had the effect of locking minority
employees into lower paying positions. 78 The Fifth Circuit used the Local
189 "present effects of past discrimination" test and struck down the sen-
iority system as a violation of title VII.79 The Supreme Court rejected the
Fifth Circuit's approach and held that bona fide seniority systems are pro-
tected by section 703(h), even if such systems perpetuate the discrimina-
tory impact of employment practices that antedate the Act.80 The Court
acknowledged that the purpose of the Act was to eliminate both overt and
subtle employment practices that discriminate in effect against a particular
group8l and that many seniority systems "'operate to "freeze" the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.' "82 The Court held,
however, that both the plain language and the legislative history of section
703(h) indicate that Congress was aware of the discriminatory effect of
many seniority systems but nevertheless "extended a measure of immunity
to them."'83
On the same day it decided Teamsters, the Court rendered its decision in
United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans.8 4 Evans involved a stewardess who had
been discharged under a post-Act policy that was struck down as discrimi-
natory in a separate action.85 She reapplied and was rehired, but United
treated her as a new employee and denied her previously accumulated sen-
iority.86 In its opinion the Court extended the holding of Teamsters by
stating that section 703(h) protects seniority systems that perpetuate the
discriminatory effects of post-Act practices, if those practices were not the
subject of a timely complaint.8 7 The decisions in Teamsters and Evans
77. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
78. Id at 329-31. In Teamsters the United States brought an action against a nation-
wide common carrier of freight and the union representing many of its employees. The
Government alleged that the company and union had discriminated against blacks and
Spanish-surnamed persons by placing them in lower paying servicemen positions and local
city driver positions while placing whites in the more desirable line-driver jobs. The dis-
criminatees were discouraged from transferring to line-driver jobs by a seniority system that
required forfeiture of seniority upon transfer. Id at 328-32.
79. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated,
431 U.S. 324 (1977) (consolidated on appeal with Teamsters).
80. 431 U.S. at 353-54. The Court stated, "[W]e hold that an otherwise neutral, legiti-
mate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may
perpetuate pre-Act discrimination." Id
81. Id at 348.
82. Id at 349 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
83. 431 U.S. at 350.
84. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
85. Id at 554-55. In 1968, when the plaintiff was discharged, United adhered to a pol-
icy that required all flight attendants to be single. Consequently, when the plaintiff married,
she was forced to resign. Id at 554.
86. Id at 555.
87. Id at 558. The Court declared, "A discriminatory act which is not made the basis
for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the
statute was passed." Id
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represent a retreat from the narrow construction given to section 703(h) in
Franks.88 The Court in Teamsters and Evans implicitly found that Con-
gress did "intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into
discriminatory patterns that existed before the act" 89 when this perpetua-
tion is accomplished through a bona fide seniority system. 90
These decisions by the Supreme Court shed some light on the scope of
the seniority exception embodied in section 703(h), but none of them con-
sidered the specific question of whether section 703(h) applies to seniority
systems established after the effective date of the Act. Although no lower
court decisions had expressly dealt with this issue, several courts appar-
ently assumed that section 703(h) applied equally to both pre- and post-
Act seniority systems. In Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists9' the Sixth Circuit upheld a seniority system established after
the effective date of the Act 92 and applied the bona fide test of section
703(h)93 rather than the disparate impact test of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 94 The court drew no distinction between pre- and post-Act seniority
systems. The Eighth Circuit, in Hameed v. International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers Local Union No. 396,95
held that a seniority system established in 1972 must be judged in light of
Teamsters and Evans, which "immunize bona fide seniority systems which
have a disproportionate impact on blacks or other minorities, provided
that any disparity is not the result of intentional discrimination. ' 96 Nu-
merous district courts have also required proof of discriminatory intent
before striking down post-Act seniority systems as unlawful. 97
While all of these decisions assumed that section 703(h) applies to post-
Act seniority systems, none of them confronted the issue directly. 98 Ap-
parently, the issue was not raised or considered, and the relevant legisla-
tive history was not discussed in any of these cases.99 The Fourth Circuit,
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
90. Teamsters, 431 U.S. 352-54; see C. SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 130.
91. 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
92. 565 F.2d at 1379. Collective bargaining agreements establishing or revising the sen-
iority system were signed in 1965, 1968, and 1971. Id at 1376.
93. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
95. 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980).
96. Id at 516.
97. See, e.g., Johnson v. Burroughs Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 963 (S.D.
Fla. 1980) (seniority system established in 1974 analyzed for bona fides under § 703(h));
Sanders v. Sherwin Williams Co., 495 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (post-Act revisions to
seniority system analyzed for bona fides under § 703(h) despite claim of disparate impact);
Edmondson v. United States Steel Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1745 (N.D. Ala.
1979) (seniority system established in 1973 ruled bona fide under § 703(h) over claim of
adverse impact); see also Brief of Petitioners The American Tobacco Company and Ameri-
can Brands, Inc. at 25 n.32, American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 71 L. Ed.
2d 748 (1982), and cases cited therein.
98. See Brief for Respondents John Patterson, et a. at 35 n.28, American Tobacco Co.
99. Id
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in its en banc opinion in Patterson v. American Tobacco Co. 100 was the first
circuit to examine expressly the question of whether post-Act seniority sys-
tems are protected by section 703(h). The Fourth Circuit's holding that
section 703(h) did not apply to post-Act seniority systems conflicted with
the decisions of other circuits and readied the issue for Supreme Court
review.
II. AMERICAN TOBACCO Co. v PATTERSON
In American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson the Supreme Court limited its re-
view to the construction of section 703(h); more specifically, the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether section 703(h) applies to all seniority
systems or just those established prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.101
The Court held that section 703(h) applies to all seniority systems, whether
adopted before or after the effective date of the Civil Rights Act. ' 0 2 Justice
White, writing for the majority, 10 3 relied heavily on what he called the
"plain language" of section 703(h). 104 The Court first noted the scrutiny
the language of the Act had received during its drafting. 05 As the section
does not expressly distinguish between pre- and post-Act seniority systems,
the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to make such a distinc-
tion.' 0 6 In support of this conclusion the Court compared section 703(h),
which does not contain a grandfather clause, '0 7 to section 701(b), 108 which
contains such a clause, and stated that this difference "increases our reluc-
tance to transform a provision that we have previously described as. . . a
definitional clause into a grandfather clause."' 10 9
The Court found more support for its holding in the legislative history
100. 634 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 71 L. Ed. 2d 748
(1982).
101. 102 S. Ct. at 1537, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 754.
102. Id at 1542, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 760.
103. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor.
104. The Court's reliance on plain language may be misplaced. The language of
§ 703(h) appears to be all but plain as indicated by the lower courts' struggle with the section
in the noted case. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
105. 102 S. Ct. at 1537, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 755. "As Senator Dirksen explained, 'I doubt very
much whether in my whole legislative lifetime any measure has received so much meticu-
lous attention. We have tried to be mindful of every word, of every comma, and of the
shading of every phrase.'" Id (quoting I 10 CONG. REC. 11,935 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Dirksen)); see also Vaas, supra note 24, at 444.
106. 102 S. Ct. at 1538-39, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 757.
107. A "grandfather clause" is a "[p]rovision in a new law or regulation exempting those
already in or a part of the existing system which is being regulated." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 629 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Such clauses are "calculated to prevent hardship by saving
accrued rights and interests from the operation of a new rule." 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.12 (4th ed. Supp. 1982).
108. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Section 701(b) calls
for the definition of "employer" to be applied on a "step-down" basis; during the first year
after the Act's effective date, persons with 25 or more employees were considered employers,
during the second year anyone with 15 or more employees was considered an employer, etc.
Id
109. 102 S. Ct. at 1537, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 755 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 761 (1976)).
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of section 703(h). 110 The Court noted the unusual character of the Act's
history and acknowledged that much of the debate surrounding section
703(h) concerned its effect on established seniority rights."1  Reasoning
that the Senators used these terms only in response to specific charges that
the bill would destroy existing seniority rights, the majority, however, re-
fused to read the references to established rights as limiting the scope of
the section.1 2 The Court admitted that the legislative history did not pro-
vide much guidance on the issue under consideration,' 13 but concluded
that, at the very least, the legislative history did not indicate any congres-
sional intent contrary to the plain language of the section." 14
Relying on its prior decisions, the Court stated that both Teamsters' '
and Evans'1 6 reflect the Supreme Court's view that title VII gives special
treatment to seniority systems.'1 7 The Court stated that those two deci-
sions stand for the proposition that "'[s]ection 703(h) on its face im-
munizes all bona fide seniority systems.' "118 The Court strained to find
support for its holding in those two cases, however, for the issue in each
case was only whether section 703(h) protected seniority systems that per-
petuated the effects of past discriminatory acts. When the Court an-
nounced in Teamsters that section 703(h) applied to "all" seniority
systems, it meant that section 703(h) does not distinguish between seniority
systems that perpetuate prior discrimination and those that do not. The
Court did not use "all" in the sense that section 703(h) applies to all senior-
ity systems whether adopted before or after the Act. 19 The issue of the
applicability of section 703(h) to post-Act seniority systems was never
raised or discussed in either Teamsters or Evans, and thus those cases are,
110. Id at 1539-40, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 757-58. The Court cited to its previous description of
the legislative history of § 703(h) in Franks, 424 U.S. at 759-61.
111. 102 S. Ct. at 1540,71 L. Ed. 2d at758;seesupra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
112. 102 S. Ct. at 1540, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 758.
113. Id at 1539, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 757. "The most which can be said for the legislative
history of § 703(h) is that it is inconclusive with respect to the issue presented in this case."
Id
114. Id at 1540, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 759.
115. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 1541, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 759. The Court also cited Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977), in which the Court stated that "seniority systems are
afforded special treatment under Title VII itself."
118. 102 S. Ct. at 1541, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 759 (emphasis in original) (quoting International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 n.30 (1977)).
119. In deciding Teamsters, the Court did not directly deal with the applicability of
§ 703(h) to post-Act seniority systems, but implicitly indicated that § 703(h) was designed to
protect only pre-Act seniority systems:
Title VII would not outlaw such differences in treatment among employees as
flowed from a bona fide seniority system that allowed for full exercise of sen-
iority accumulated before the effective date of the Act ...
...[Tihe congressional judgment was that Title VII should not outlaw the
use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested
seniority rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged in
discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.
431 U.S. at 352-53 (emphasis added; citations and footnotes omitted).
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at best, inconclusive on the issue that confronted the Court in American
Tobacco Co.
Finally, the court gave a policy reason for not restricting the application
of section 703(h) to pre-Act seniority systems. A national labor policy
favoring minimal government intervention, said the Court, clashes at times
with the policy of eliminating discrimination reflected in title VII.120 Ac-
cording to the Court, Congress realized that these two policies would at
times oppose each other and Congress adopted section 703(h) as the bal-
ance between them.' 2 ' This conclusion is somewhat remarkable in light of
the Court's prior discussion of the legislative history, which nowhere indi-
cates that Congress, in considering section 703(h), was concerned with
striking a balance between the purposes of title VII and a national labor
policy favoring freedom in collective bargaining.' 22 Congress's concern
lay rather, as Justice Brennan pointed out, with balancing the vested sen-
iority rights of incumbent employees against the policy of eliminating
discrimination. 23
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, agreed with the majority that the plain language of section
703(h) should be controlling, but disagreed as to what that plain language
meant.124 Justice Brennan's dissent noted that section 703(h) expressly re-
fers to only the application of a seniority system 25 and therefore con-
cluded that the adoption or establishment of a seniority system is not
covered by the section. Thus, under Justice Brennan's reading of the sec-
tion, the post-Act adoption of a seniority system would be tested under the
Griggs disparate impact test, while the application of such a system would
be tested under the section 703(h) bona fide test.' 26
Justice Brennan also viewed the legislative history in a somewhat differ-
ent light than the majority. He agreed with the majority that many of the
references in the legislative history appeared to be concerned with the ef-
fect of section 703(h) on seniority rights in existence as of the effective date
120. 102 S. Ct. at 1541, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 760. The Court cited Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 346 (1964), and Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977), for
the proposition that seniority provisions are important in collective bargaining. The Court
concluded that a national labor policy favoring freedom in collective bargaining mandated
that restrictions on seniority systems should be limited. 102 S. Ct. at 1541, 71 L. Ed. 2d at
760.
121. Id at 1541, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 760.
122. All of the Court's references to the legislative history, in both American Tobacco Co.
and Franks, reflect a congressional concern with only the effect § 703(h) would have on the
vested seniority rights of incumbent employees.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 1545, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Congress saw
§ 703(h) as focusing on the protection of employee expectations that develop during the
pendency of a seniority plan." Id at 1545, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 764 (emphasis in original).
124. Id at 1543, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 762.
125. "[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply differ-
ent standards .... Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (em-
phasis added).
126. 102 S. Ct. at 1538 n.4, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 756 n.4; see supra notes 19 & 46-51 and
accompanying text.
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of the Act. 127 Unlike the majority, however, Justice Brennan concluded
that these references were fashioned in terms of "established" rights, be-
cause these were the only rights that section 703(h) was intended to
protect. 28
In a separate dissent Justice Stevens responded to the majority's policy
argument by concluding that the argument was prompted by fears that
virtually all post-Act seniority systems would be unlawful if not protected
by section 703(h).' 29 Justice Stevens noted that even under the Griggs dis-
parate impact test a number of seniority systems would still survive if they
were substantially related to a valid business purpose.' 30 Thus Justice Ste-
vens considered the Court's fears to be unfounded.131
The Court's holding in American Tobacco Co. follows the lead of Team-
sters and Evans in construing section 703(h) as a broad exception to the
provisions of title VII. The impact of the American Tobacco Co. decision
remains to be seen, but it will certainly close one avenue of redress for
individuals locked into the discriminatory effects of previous employment
practices by a seniority system. Other sources of protection for the dis-
criminatee do exist. The Civil Rights Acts of 1866132 and 1871133 provide
some aid to victims of discrimination, and employees may have a cause of
action against their union under the National Labor Relations Act 134 for
discriminatory practices.135 These alternative remedies, however, may not
help to remedy the plight of that generation of minorities who were the
127. 102 S. Ct. at 1545, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1544, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 763. "Congress' basic purpose in adding [§ 703(h)] was
to protect the expectations that employees acquire through the continued operation of a
seniority system." Id (emphasis in original).
129. Id at 1548, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 769. Without the protection of § 703(h), seniority sys-
tems would be subjected to the Griggs standard of disparate impact. Justice Stevens stated
that it would be "virtually impossible to establish a seniority system whose classification of
employees will not have a disparate impact on members of some race or sex." Id
130. For example, the District Court in American Tobacco Co. found that three of the
original nine lines of progression were justified by business necessity. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
131. The business necessity defense may not be as helpful in protecting seniority systems
as Justice Stevens believes. In order to establish this defense the employer may be required
to show that, without the seniority system, employees would be able to perform the job
adequately. See Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1181 (5th Cir.) (educational
requirements), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). The employer may be required to meet a
heavy burden of demonstrating that the seniority system is necessary to maintain safety and
reduce economic and human risks. See Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219
(10th Cir. 1972) (educational requirements). For a more complete discussion of the business
necessity defense, see S. AGID, supra note 19, at 527-31; Note, Business Necessity Under Title
VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
133. Id §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
135. Other means of protection are available, such as that afforded by executive orders.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at
1232-36 (1976), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 1233 (1976); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 207 (1969),
reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 1236 (1976). For a full discussion of alternative reme-
dies for employment discrimination, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 75, at 599-
768.
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victims of discriminatory employment practices prior to the effective date
of title VII and who must now continue to suffer the effects of this discrim-
ination as the result of a seniority system.
III. CONCLUSION
In American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson the United States Supreme Court
construed section 703(h) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
applicable to all bona fide seniority systems, whether established before or
after the effective date of the Act. The Court based its decision on the
plain language of the section, the Act's legislative history, the Teamsters
and Evans decisions, and a national labor policy favoring freedom in col-
lective bargaining. The Court broadly interpreted section 703(h), which
excepts seniority systems from the employment practices made unlawful
by title VII. Seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of past discrimi-
nation are now protected by section 703(h) even if they are adopted after
the effective date of the Act. While the Court's interpretation of section
703(h) will by no means defeat the underlying purpose of title VII, it will
make equal employment opportunity difficult for many employees to at-
tain. Congress's overall purpose in enacting title VII was the elimination
of discrimination in employment; the Court's decision in American To-
bacco will retard the attainment of this goal.
Kevin Edmund Teel
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